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Adoption Laws Of Ohio:
A Critical And Comparative Study
William K. Yost*
ADOPTION HAS BEEN DEFINED as "The act by which the relations of
t.paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing be-
tween persons not so related."' However, the result of adoption is
the creation of a status, that of parent and child, and not of a con-
tractual obligation. In this respect it is similar to marriage.2
A study of adoption perforce requires an examination of the
practice and the law involved in the placement of children for adop-
tion, the termination of the rights and obligation of the natural
parents, the procedures of adoption in the courts and the legal effect
of the adoptive status as it affects the child and the adopting parents.
Each of these facets will be developed in this sequence.
Adoption was not known in the common law. As a partial and
very limited substitute for the care and training of children by per-
sons other than their parents there developed the concepts of the
apprentice and the indentured servant which survived well into the
19th century. Massachusetts in 1851 was the first common law state
to enact a general adoption statute. In some states the adoptive status
was created by private contract between the natural parents and the
adoptive parents and this procedure survived in Louisiana and Texas
until recently. This concept has its vestigial remainder in the laws
of several of our states which provide for an adoptive contract which
must now, however, be submitted to the court for approval. Adoption
was well known in the early Roman and Greek law and the practice
has been followed and prescribed by the Hindus for centuries.
The absence of a common law background for adoption has been
reflected in the rule of strict construction which many courts have
applied to the proceedings. This judicial insistence upon a literal
compliance with the statutory provisions has resulted in some in-
stances in the setting aside of an adoption with tragic consequences
to all the parties involved.3
*Of Massillon, Ohio; member of the Ohio Bar, formerly legal counsel to the Family
Service Society of Massillon.
1 Miller, The Lawzyers Place in Adoption, 21 TENN. L. REv. 630 (1951).
2 Note, Review Hacks Estate, 35 YALE L. J. 890 (1926) ; In re Estate of Gompf, 175
Ohio St. 400, 195 N.E. 2d 806 (1962).
3 In re Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W. 2d 759 (1951); In re Adoption
of Morrison,, 267 Wis. 625, 66 N.W. 2d 732 (1954) (Surrender of illegitimate child
for adoption was executed by minor mother in the presence of her mother and her
attorney and before a circuit judge. Adoption was decreed without the approval
of her guardian ad litem as required by Wisconsin law. Natural mother then married
natural father and filed action to withdraw her consent and revoke adoption. In
first action the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the law must be strictly
construed and complied with and revoked adoption. Adoptive parents then had state
legislature pass an act changing law and establishing conditions under which adoption
could be approved. In the subsequent decision the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
approved the adoption. The matter was in continual litigation from 1947 until 1954-.).
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The first statute of adoption in Ohio was enacted in 1859. It pro-
vided a limited procedure in the probate court for the judicial recog-
nition of the adoptive status and of the rights of inheritance which
issued from it.4 The statute was the framework which was revised
and amplified by subsequent amendments until there evolved the
adoptive procedure which we know today.
Previously, in 1854, there had been enacted a statute providing
for the designation of an heir who would thereupon have the status
of a child of the designator, but only as to the rights of inheritance.5
The other cross rights and obligations of natural parents and children
were not encompassed in this legislation. There exists today a sim-
ilar statute.6 While its provisions are sufficiently broad to cover minor
children, its use is for the most part limited to adults who are not
otherwise eligible to be adopted in Ohio. 7
Adoption involves not only legal problems, but social problems
as well.8 The welfare of the child is, of course, of prime importance.
The child must be protected from unwise separation from its natural
parents, from placement with and adoption by persons who are unfit
to have the responsibility of his care, and from interference by natural
parents after he has become adjusted to his adoptive home.9 He must
further be protected in his rights of inheritance from and through
his adoptive parents.
These problems are laced with overtones of emotion, of religion
and of race. The natural instincts of parenthood, love, affection and
devotion to family ties cannot be underestimated or negated. Reli-
gious dogmas in many cases strongly influence the adoptive place-
ment of children. The Roman Catholic Church, in particular, is
known to take a firm position in opposition to the adoption of chil-
dren born to parents of that denomination by persons of any other
religious background.1 0 Racial origin presents practical if not legal
problems of assimiliation into the family and community life of the
adoptive parents. In some states statutory prohibitions of interracial
adoptions still exist.11 Whether such statutes can now survive an
attack on constitutional grounds is doubtful.
The Ohio statute provides that the racial, religious and cultural
backgrounds of the child and the adoptive parents must be taken into
account and included in the report made to the court by the agency
4 56 Ohio Laws 82 (1959).
5 52 Ohio Laws 78 (1854); Lathrop v. Young, 25 Ohio St. 451 (1874).
6 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (Page 1971).
7 Id. § 3107.01 (Page 1971).
8 Katz, Judicial & Statutory Trends in the Lawt of Adoption, 51 GEORGrow N L. J. 64
(1962).
9 Comment, The Inadequacy of Domicile as a Jurisdictional Base in Adoptive Pro-
ceedings, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 761 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Inadequacy].
10 Katz, supra note 8, at 70.
11 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:422 (1959).
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which conducts the investigation to determined the suitability of the
adoption.1 2 The best interest of the child is, however, the overriding
factor to be considered by the court of either granting or refusing
the adoption. 13
Adoptive Placement of Children
Children are not like a commodity that can be stored on a shelf
awaiting a proper adoptive home. From the date of birth they have
the human needs of love and care and learning, and they are acquiring
the elements of human personality and emotion. Unnecessary delay
in placement of the child can result in adjustment problems when
a home is found. Where the placement is made in an unsuitable home,
the whole life of the child may be blighted through no fault of his
own. Where an attempt is made to remove and replace a child,
serious problems of emotional adjustment are encountered both as
to the child and the prospective adoptive parents.
In the past all placements were private, that is, they were the
result of the delivery of the person of the child and of his property,
if any, by his natural parents or parent to a third person who would
raise the child as his own and would apply'to the proper court for
adoption of the child. The arrangements were often made by physi-
cians who delivered the child or lawyers who knew of the birth, but
many were just the result of happenstance. Orphanages served as
clearing houses for persons seeking adoptive children.
While a child is not a commodity in the sense that it can be
stored on a shelf, it is a commodity in the sense that there has been
a steady demand for white, healthy, adoptable children by childless
couples who are willing to pay for the opportunity to thus acquire
a family. Unscrupulous persons and organizations have taken ad-
vantage of the profit opportunities in such a situation and have acted
as brokers at substantial fees in arranging for the placement of
children for adoption. This so called "Black Market in Babies" has
been the subject of an investigation by the United States Senate. 14
What "Black Market" now exists serves for the most part to provide
children for those people who, for some reason such as advanced age
or instability, have been unable to obtain a child from an authorized
agency.
To protect the helpless child against the abuses of these practices
and the tragedies of an improper placement, most states now require
that adoptive placements be made by authorized agencies and make
placements by any other person or organization a criminal offense.
12 Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.05 (E) (Page 1970).
13 In re Adoption of Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E. 2d 5 (1962).
14 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th
Congress, 1st Session 2-5, 192-199 (1955) ; Moppets on the Market, The Problem of
Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE LAW JOURNAL 715 (1950).
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In Ohio a legal adoptive placement must be made either by an
authorized agency, public or private, or by an order of the probate
division of the Common Pleas Court made after an investigation
and hearing. 15 Criminal penalties are imposed against anyone making
a placement in violation of these provisions.1"
The manner in which agencies obtain permanent custody of
children will be discussed under the heading "Termination of Par-
ental Rights" which follows.
The agencies which have placement authority are under the
control and supervision of the Division of Social Administration in
the Ohio Department of Public Welfare, either as county child wel-
fare departments or boards or as private organizations such as Fam-
ily Service Societies and Catholic Service Leagues, licensed for this
purpose by the Division. Custodians in a foreign state or country
may be authorized by the Division to place children in this state,
if they have similar authority in their own jurisdictions and the chil-
dren are guaranteed free of physical, mental and character defects.'
7
The parents of a child who is not in the permanent custody of
the Division of Social Administration or of anyone of its agencies,
public or licensed, may legally place the child for adoption by first
obtaining an order of the probate court of the county where either
the natural parents or the prospective adoptive parents reside ap-
proving such placement.
Similarly a person seeking to adopt a related child or an agency
having custody of a child, (but without authority for adoptive place-
ment) in situations where the natural parents are dead or have
abandoned the child, may apply to the probate court where the child
or the relative resides or the agency is located for an approval of the
placement of the child for adoption. The Ohio statute which author-
izes such court approved placements unfortunately appears to have
been carelessly drafted and contains serious omissions and contra-
dictions.' 8
The proceedings, although requiring an investigation by qualified
persons or agencies, do not terminate the right of the natural parents
to consent to the subsequent adoption of the child in situations where
such consent is required. If the parents refuse to give such consent,
the adoption will fail and the child will be subject to the dangerous
emotional problems involved in its removal and replacement which
the statute was presumably enacted to prevent.
Only the natural parents are required to appear before the court
in a placement proceedings and the prospective adoptive parents are
not, at this crucial point, subject to the scrutiny of the court except
15 OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5103.16, 5103.17.(Page 1971).
.16 Id. § 5103.99 (Page .1971).
17 Id. §2151.39 (Page 1968).
18 Id. § 5103.16 (Page 1971).
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through the eyes of the investigator. As the only issue is that of the
proper placement of the child, it would seem logical that the persons
with whom the child is to be placed should also appear before the
court. If it is the purpose of the statute to avoid the mutual identifi-
cation of the naural parents and the prospective adoptive parents, it
is difficult to see how this result can. be accomplished as the appli-
cation filed by the natural parents must specify the proposed place-
ment.
Natural parents or the guardian of the person of the child who
do not themselves apply for the court approved adoptive placement
or otherwise appear before the court and approve the same, must be
served with notice of the placement hearing. The statute does not
provide for the possibility that the natural parent or guardian of the
person of the child may appear and object to the placement where
the proceedings are brought by an agency or a relative. It would
appear that the court would have no jurisdiction to approve a place-
ment over such objection.
Minor parents can consent to the placement of their child by
signing a consent before a probate judge or authorized court officer
either in or out of court or before an employee of a licensed child
agency after the birth of the child. The employee must make an
affidavit that the legal rights of the natural mother were explained
to her before the consent was signed. This statutory provision also
encompasses the consent to the surrender or adoption of a child and
the provisions of the act will be discussed in more detail under the
heading "Termination of Rights of Natural Parents" which follows:
Where a child has been placed in violation of the laws relating
to the placement of children in foster homes, the probate court in
a subsequent adoption proceedings may, in its discretion, refer the
matter of the placement to the juvenile court or may itself approve or
disapprove the same. Either court must decide the question by de-
termining whether the placement is for the best interests of the
child. If the placement is approved, the probate court may then
proceed with the adoption. If it is not approved, the question of the
custody of the child is a matter for determination by the juvenile
court.19 The fact that the probate court has authority to approve a
placement before it is made does not deprive the court of the author-
ity in a subsequent adoption proceedings to approve or disapprove a
placement made in violation of the law. .
The statute does not make the placement of the child conditioned
upon the filing of an adoption proceeding within a reasonable time.
Presumably after approving the placement the court loses jurisdiction
over the child and the placement may continue indefinitely leaving
the child in a limbo, without the benefit of a formal adoption, to
its great prejudice.
19 Id. § 3107.08 (Page 1970).
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The statutory restrictions and prohibitions relating to the place-
ment of children do not apply when the adoption is by a stepparent.2 0
Where parents, guardians or custodians attempt to place or have
placed a child for adoption contrary to law, the juvenile court may
declare the child a neglected child and place it in the temporary or
permanent custody of a proper agency.21
Termination of Rights of Natural Parents
Under the common law and the statutes of Ohio, parents are
charged with the responsibility generally for the support, care and
education of their minor children. On the other hand, they are en-
titled to the companionship and obedience of their children, to their
earnings under certain circumstances, and to their support if they be
in need of the same.
At some point in the adoptive process, except in the case of adop-
tion by stepparents, these rights and obligations of the natural par-
ents must be legally severed and the rights and obligations of the
adoptive parents in the same respects must be established. The ter-
mination of the rights of the natural parent, whether voluntary or
involuntary, involve the parent and his child. The proceedings for
the adoption involve the child and the adoptive parents. The state
is involved in both portions of the proceedings on behalf of the child.
No issues should, however, arise between the natural parents and the
adoptive parents. In fact, mutual identification by these parties should
be avoided, if possible, in the best interests of the child. There should
be no possibility of a contest directly between natural parents and
prospective adoptive parents as to which is better able to raise the
child.
The issues to be held in a controversy over the termina-
tion of parental rights, i.e., the degree of unfitness of the par-
ent are quite different than in the inquiry before the Adop-
tion Court. The two should not be mixed. The trial of con-
troversial issues over parental rights should not cause an
influence in the adoptive proceedings where the sole inquiry
should be the future best intersts of the child.22
Contrary to these principles, Ohio laws mix termination of par-
ental rights, adoptive placement and the adoption process itself in
an almost indigestible hodge-podge of statutory provisions. The per-
tinent statutes are spread among the code sections dealing with the
Department of Public Welfare, the juvenile court and the probate
court. In an effort to provide some order to the discussion of the ter-
mination of parental rights, a division will be made between volun-
tary and involuntary termination.
20 Id. § 5103.16 (Page 1971).
21 Id. § 2151.03 (Page 1971).
22 CHILDRENS BUREAU PUBLICATION No. 394, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (1961); UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT DRAFTED BY THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (approved by the American Bar Asociation;
August 28, 1953).
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A. Voluntary Termination
Any natural parent, or the guardian or person having the custody
of a child may surrender the permanent custody of the child to an
agency, either public or private, authorized or licensed for this pur-
pose by the State of Ohio. The surrender must be in writing and
may authorize the agency to consent to the adoption of the child. 3
In a subsequent adoption proceeding only the agency having such
authority is a proper party and need consent to the adoption. The
natural parents who have so acted are not proper parties, and their
further consent to the adoption is not required. This form of voluntary
surrender, therefore, effectively terminates the rights of the natural
parents as to the child involved,2 4 except as to the rights of inheri-
tance which are not terminated until an adoption is decreed.2 5
As in the case of the placement of a child, a minor parent may
execute a surrender and consent to an adoption to the same effect as
if an adult, if the consent is executed before a probate judge or an
authorized court official in or out of court or before an employee of
a licensed child welfare agency. If the latter, the consent must be
accompanied by an affidavit of the employee that the "legal rights"
of the mother have been fully explained to her prior to the execu-
tion of the consent and that all of this was accomplished after the
birth of the child.2
6
Evidently the legislature in its wisdom did not consider that it
is necessary that a minor natural father have an explanation of his
"legal rights" before consenting to the placement, surrender or
adoption of his child. The statute specifically provides that it does
not apply to adoption by a stepparent thereby casting doubt upon
the validity of a consent or surrender signed by a minor natural
parent in a stepparent adoption. No court appearance or judicial ap-
proval of a surrender is required and, except in the case of a minor,
no provision is made for the same. A surrender in the absence of
fraud or misrepresentation cannot be withdrawn or revoked without
the consent of the agency involved even though the signer is a
minor.27 Where a minor unmarried mother surrenders her child for
the purposes of adoption to an authorized agency and later married
the natural father of the child, such marriage does not invalidate the
surrender or give the natural father the right to revoke or disaffirm
it. 2 8
23 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.15 (Page 1971).
24 In re Bolling, 83 Ohio App. 1, 82 N.E. 2d 135 (1949).
25 Maurer v. Becker, 26 Ohio St. 2d 254, 271 N.E. 2d 255 (1971).
26 OHio REv. CooE ANN. § 5103.16 (Page 1971).
2T Kozak v. Lutheran Children's Aid Society, 164- Ohio St. 335, 130 N.E. 2d 796 (1955);
In re Zelrick, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 525, 129 N.E. 2d 661 (1955) ; French v. Catholic Corn-
munity League, 69 Ohio App. 442, 44 N.E. 2d 113 (1942) (Withdrawal of surrender
contrasted with withdrawal of consent for adoption).
25 Ex Parte Combs, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 458, 150 N.E. 2d 1505 (1958).
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A natural parent who has not surrendered his child to an agency
may voluntarily terminate his parental rights by consenting to the
adoption in the adoption proceedings in the probate court. The con-
sent must be given by both parents even though there has been a
divorce and one of the parents has been given sole custody of the
child. Prior to January 1, 1944, the Ohio law permitted a consent solely
by the parent having custody. This position was in accordance with
the rule generally followed in other jurisdictions. 29 The change in
the Ohio rule requiring the consent of both parents properly gives
recognition to the fact that custody is temporary and can be changed.
In addition the noncustodial parent in the divorce proceedings still
retains the legal obligation to support and maintain the child and the
rights of a parent as to visitation, inheritance and support, except
as they may be modified in the divorce decree.
The mother is considered to be the sole parent of an illegitimate
child and the consent of the natural father in such a situation is not
required.30
The consent may be obtained prior to the time the petition to
adopt is filed. 3 ' The consent must be in writing and be verified or
acknowledged and cannot be withdrawn after the court has granted
an interlocutory order or final decree of adoption.
3 2
B. Involuntary Termination
The rights and obligations of natural parents in and to their
children may be terminated without their consent prior to adoption
by proceedings in the juvenile court and, as part of the adoption pro-
ceedings, by the probate court.
The juvenile court, if it finds that a child is neglected or depend-
ent, may terminate the rights and obligations of the natural parents
of the child by committing it to the permanent custody of a public
or certified agency.33 The court must find that there has been a will-
ful or indifferent disregard of the duty owed by a parent to his child,
based upon evidence existing at the time of the hearing.3 4 Upon such
a determination and certification, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
over the child ceases.3 5 The agency is authorized to consent to the adop-
tion, and the consent of the natural parents is no longer required. 36
In a situation where a child is not so committed by the juvenile
court, but has been abandoned by its parents either willfully, or in-
29 OHIO GEN. CODE § 8025 (1910).
30 Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06(B) (1) (Page 1970).
31 In re Adoption of Burdette, 83 Ohio App. 368, 83 N.E. 2d 813 (1948).
82 OHIO REV. CoDe ANN. § 3107.06 (Page 1970)..
33 Id. §§ 2151.35, 2151.353 (D) (Page 1971).
34 In re Masters, 165 Ohio St. 503, 137 N.E. 2d 752 (1956) ; In re Kronjaeger, 166 Ohio
St. 172, 140 N.E. 2d 773 (1957).
35 OHIo REV. CoDe ANN. § 2151.38 (Page 1965).
36 Conti v. Shriner, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 193 (Ct. App. 1939).
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voluntarily by reason of their adjudication for mental disability, and
the child is not in the permanent custody of an authorized agency,
it must be placed in a prospective adoptive home, and a proceeding for
adoption must be filed before the probate court may consider whether
the rights of the natural parents to the child can be terminated and
the adoption decreed without their consent. The probate court may
decree the adoption of a child without the consent of the parents in
such a situation if it finds that the natural parents of the child have
willfully failed to properly support and maintain the child for more
than two years prior to the filing of the petition or if the parents
have been adjudged incompetent by rason of mental disability.37
If the probate court determines that the consent of the natural
parents to the adoption cannot be dispensed with and they refuse to
give such consent, the adoption cannot be completed. The child
may have to be removed from the adoptive home regardless of its
best interests and to its prejudice and to the prejudice of the pros-
pective adoptive parents.
The major problems in the matter of involuntary termination
have arisen under the provision which makes the consent of the
natural parents unnecessary if he or she is found to have willfully
failed to properly support and maintain the child for more than two
years. Prior to the amendment of the statute in 1963, the burden of
proof of willful failure to support and maintain was upon the peti-
tioner for the adoption. 38 Mere failure to support without proof of
willfullness on the part of the natural parent was not sufficient.39
The statute now provides that
Proof of failure to properly support and maintain the
child for a period of more than two years immediately preced-
ing the filing of the petition shall be prima facie evidence of
willful failure to properly support and maintain the child.40
No cases have been reported which construe this language. The
words "properly support and maintain" remain as a source of trouble
especially in situations where there has been some support and at-
tention by natural parents, 41 or where it is established that the natural
parents could not furnish support and had not been requested or
expected to do so. 42
The Supreme Court has held, in cases decided before the amend-
ment of the statute, that the words "properly support and maintain"
imply personal care and attention by the natural parents as well as
financial support,43 and that such obligations extend to a mother who
37 In re Ramsey, 164 Ohio St. 567, 132 N.E. 2d 469 (1956).
38 In re Adoption of Baker, 100 Ohio App. 146, 136 N.E. 2d 147 (1955).
39 In re Adoption of Earhart, 117 Ohio App. 73, 136 N.E. 2d 147 (1961).
40 OHio REV. CoDE ANN. § 3107.06(B) (4) (Page 1970).
41 In re Adoption of Devore, 111Ohio App. 1, 190 N.E. 2d 469 (1959).
42 In re Adoption of Peters, 113 Ohio App. 173, 177 N.E. 2d 541 (1961).
43 In re Adoption of Biddle, 168 Ohio St. 209, 152"N.E. 2d 105 (1958).
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does not have custody of a child which is being supported by its
father.44 These cases were approved and followed in a case decided
after the amendment to the statute to which the court refers in the
opinion as indicating a legislative intent to approve the prior holding
of the court. 45
It does not appear that the amendment will solve the problems
involved in the burden of proof and make less likely the failure to
terminate the rights of the allegedly neglectful parent. In any event,
this provision of the adoption statute creates issues directly between
the natural parents and the adoptive parents as to the future welfare
of the involved child. As has been pointed out, the natural parents
should be resolved in a termination proceeding held prior to and
separate from the adoption.
When the natural parents have been adjudged incompetent by
reason of mental disability, the probate court is required to appoint
a guardian ad litem, for the incompetent parent or parents, who is
charged with the duty of investigating the existing situation.46 If the
guardian ad litem is satisfied that the adoption should be completed,
he is authorized to consent to the same. The decision as to whether
or not the consent shall be forthcoming appears to be with the guard-
ian ad litem. If the consent is given the court can, of course, pass
upon its propriety in deciding whether the adoption should be decreed.
If, however, the guardian ad litem should refuse to consent to the
adoption there appears to be no authorization for the court to act
further in the matter even though it might be of the opinion that the
adoption would be to the best interest of all concerned.
Serious problems can arise for the parents and the child in situa-
tions where an adoption decree is closely followed by a complete
recovery by the parents of their disability. Such a recovery is not
improbable under modern medical practices. These possible prob-
lems have, however, given rise to little or no litigation. No reported
cases on the subject have been found in Ohio.
The statute should require that the court, after an investigation
and report by the guardian ad litem, make a finding that the mental
disability of the parents will be permanent or of such lengthy dura-
tion that the best interests of the child will be served by approving
the adoption. The finding should be supported by competent medical
evidence updating and amplifying the evidence supporting the orig-
inal adjudication of mental disability. The statute should further
provide that upon such a determination, the consent of the parent
to the adoption of his child would not be necessary. The requirement
of a consent by the guardian ad litem should be eliminated, as it
would not then serve any useful purpose.
44 Johnson v. Varney, 2 Ohio St. 2d 161, 207 N.E. 2d 559 (1965).
45 In re Lewis, 8 Ohio St. 2nd 25, 222 N.E. 2d 628 (1966).
46 Ouio REv. CODE ANY. § 3107.06(B) (3) (Page 1970).
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There is a possibility that the Ohio provision as now constituted
could be held to be a denial of due process of law under the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 47
Adoption Proceedings
In Ohio any person under the age of 21 years may be adopted.
48
There is no provision for the adoption of an adult person. A limited
form of adoption for adults, insofar as the rights of inheritance are
affected, is possible under designation of heirship proceedings. 49
The adoption proceedings must be filed in the probate court of
the county where the petitioner resides or the county where the child
was born, has a legal settlement or has become a public charge. Where
a child is brought from the foreign state or country of its birth into
Ohio for the purposes of adoption by Ohio residents, the proceeding
for adoption must, by elimination, be brought into the county where
the petitioners reside. Whether the mere presence of the child, under
such circumstances, within the jurisdiction of the court is sufficient
to give the court authority to enter a decree which terminates the
rights of the natural parents who reside in the foreign state or coun-
try, is a troublesome question. 50
The petitioners for adoption may be a husband and wife jointly,
a stepparent married to one of the natural or "legal" parents (evi-
dently meaning an adoptive parent) of the child to be adopted, or any
other proper person.51 Hence, in Ohio, if a minor is considered a
proper person, he can adopt another minor and there is no age differ-
ence requirement as prevails in many states. There is no requirement
that the petitioners be citizens of the United States or residents of
Ohio, but a mother of a child born out of wedlock cannot adopt the
child. 2 The Ohio statute is more broad in respect to who may adopt
than is the Model Act, which would prohibit an unmarried father who
is a minor from adopting his child after the death of its mother.53
The contents of the petition for adoption are spelled out in detail
in the statute and will not be set forth herein. 54 There is one defect,
however, which deserves comment. The statute requires that the
proposed adoptive name be used in the caption of the petition and that
the original name be set forth in the allegations of the petition, where,
of course, it is subject to the scrutiny of the adoptive parents. Thus,
the barrier of nonidentification between the adoptive parents and
47 People ex rel Nabstedt v. Berger, 3 Ill. 2d 511, 121 N.E. 2d 781 (1954).
48 OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.01(A), 3107.02 (Page 1970).
49 Id. § 2105.15, (Page 1970).
50 Comment, Inadequacy, supra note 9.
51 OHIO REv. CODE ANN § 3107.02 (Page 1970).
5 Sommers v. Doersam, 115 Ohio St. 139, 152 N.E. 387 (1926).
53 UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT § 3 (4).
51 OHIO REV. CODE ANY. § 3107.03 (Page 1970).
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the natural parents so zealously guarded in other respects, is broken
to the possible detriment of all parties concerned, including the child.
Most lawyers as a matter of practice fill in the original name
of the child after the petition has been signed by the adopting parents
to preserve this secrecy. It would seem that the identity of the child
in the proceedings could be established by the papers filed by the
next friend or by reference to the birth certificate, which must be
filed with the petition, if available.
The statute contemplates that a petition for adoption may be
filed before the child is placed in the home of the petitioners as pro-
vision is made for the filing of a supplemental petition if the child
entered the home after the filing of the petition. 5 The child must,
however, reside in the home of the petitioners at the time of the
decree, or the proceeding is void.50
The hearing date must be fixed not less than thirty nor more
than sixty days after the filing of the petition or the supplemental
petition. The court must appoint a next friend to the child and cause
notice to be given to the guardian of the person of the child and to
its parents, if their consent to the adoption is required. The notice
required is not by way of issuance and service of summons, but is
the notice prescribed by Section 2101.26 of the Ohio Revised Code,
particularly pertaining to the probate court.57
The next friend is charged with the duty to make an investigation
into the suitability of the adoption. The court has no discretion in
the matter of the appointment of a next friend, as is the case in some
other states. If the child is in the permanent custody of a public or
certified private agency, it must be appointed the next friend. If not
in such custody, the appointee may be some qualified person.
The probate court may prescribe the scope of the investigation,
but it must include inquiry into the matters set forth in particular in
the statute, including the background and identification of the natural
parents, the reasons for and circumstances surrounding the placement
of the child for adoption,58 and the suitability of the adoption con-
sidering the racial, religious and cultural backgrounds of the peti-
tioners.
The report must include a recommendation of the next friend
either approving or disapproving the adoption. The report, except
for the portion which pertains to the petitioners, is not to be filed
with the rest of the adoption papers, but must be filed separately
and is not open for inspection except upon the personal direction of
the probate judge. The report as to the petitioners should be available
to the petitioners and to their counsel and, if unfavorable, open to
55 Id. § 3107.04 (Page 1970).
,5 McLain v. Lyon, 24. Ohio App. 279, 156 N.E. 529 (1926).
57 In re Adoption of Burdette, 83 Ohio App. 368, 83 N.E. 2d 813 (1948).
58 OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 3107.04 (Page 1970).
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rebuttal on their behalf. It further should be available for the
purposes of anyone opposing the adoption. The mandatory appoint-
ment of a next friend to make a report to the court in writing does
not prevent one opposing the adoption from having a fair trial.5 9 The
next friend's report is not part of the record on appeal. 60
The court cannot proceed with the hearing on the petition unless
there is filed with the court written consents by the persons named in
the statute, to wit, the child, if he is over 12 years of age, and he has
resided in the home of the petitioners for over eight years prior to
the filing of the petition (in other areas of the law the age of 14 is
considered the age of discretion) and by each of the living parents,
adult or minor, except that the mother of an illegitimate child is con-
sidered the sole parent.61 The mother of an illegitimate child must
execute her consent in open court, if she is able; if not, in the presence
of the next friend. There appears to be no such provision for the sign-
ing of a consent by the mother of a legitimate child.6 2
If a child has been previously adopted, the written consent of the
preceding adoptive parents is required as if they were the natural
parents. Presumably the natural parents' consent is not then required,
although the statute does not so state.
The statute specifically provides that the consent of a parent is
not required if the child is in the permanent custody of a certified
agency, or if the parent has been adjudicated incompetent by reason
of mental disability or has been determined to have willfully failed
to properly support and maintain the child for two years prior to the
filing of the petition. These provisions have been previously discussed
under the heading of "Termination of Rights of Natural Parents."
The consents must be filed separately from the adoption pro-
ceedings and are not to be available to anyone, which would include
the petitioner and the child, except upon the personal discretion of
the judge. The purpose of this restriction being, of course, to avoid
identification of the natural parents by the adoptive parents. The
consents must pertain to the particular petition. A blanket consent is
invalid, although there is no requirement that the consent be exe-
cuted subsequent to the execution or filing of the petition.
As has been previously stated, a consent may not be withdrawn
after the court has entered a decree, either interlocutory or final.
However, the probate court has no jurisdiction to make a final or
interlocutory order of adoption, if written consents to the adoption
are not filed with the court in situations where such consents are
required by the statute.63
59 In re Adoption of Todhunter, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 567, 35 N.E. 2d 992 (1941).
60 In re Adoption of Kane, 91 Ohio App. 327, 108 N.E. 2d 176 (1952).
61 OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 3107.06 (Page 1960).
62 Id. § 3107.07 (Page 1960).
63 In re Ramsey, 164 Ohio St. 567, 132 N.E. 2d 469 (1956).
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Where the child is in the permanent custody of an agency clothed
with the authority to give or withhold the required consent, a ques-
tion can arise as to who actually controls the adoption process, the
agency or the court.
There are an increasing number of cases arising in states with
a statute similar to that of Ohio wherein the agency has placed a
child for adoption and then subsequently refuses to consent to the
adoption for reasons that could well be determined to be arbitrary
and not based upon a bona fide belief that the refusal is for the best
interests of the child.64 These cases are arising under factual situa-
tions where there is not much area for dispute that the adoption
would be for the best interests of the child, but the agency bases
its refusal to give its consent upon some rule or policy of its organ-
ization which is not a statutory requirement.
The following are examples of specific situations in which the
problems have arisen:
(a) A church affiliated agency places a child with persons of
same faith as that of the natural parents, but who subse-
quently undergo a bona fide change of religious conviction.
(b) A child is placed, by mistake of the agency, in a home of
prospective adoptive parents who are at the time slightly
overage by the rules of the agency.
(c) When one of the prospective adoptive parents dies following
placement and the rules of the agency prevent consent to
a single parent adoption.
An agency as next friend or custodian of the child should, of
course, have considerable discretion in approving or disapproving an
adoption by granting or withholding its consent. However, it would
appear important that the adoption court should have some authority
to approve an adoption when it finds that the agency has acted
arbitrarily and not in the best interests of the child. In some states
the statutes have been amended to give the court such authority.6 5
In Ohio it is reasonably clear that in situations where an agency
has the permanent custody of a child and its consent to the adoption
is, therefore, required, the probate court cannot approve the adop-
tion where the consent is withheld, even though the court may be
of the opinion that such refusal is arbitrary, capricious, and not based
on substantial evidence and contrary to the best interests of the
child. If, however, the position of the agency is that of next friend
only, and not of custodian, its consent to the adoption is not required,
and the court could approve the adoption despite a disapproval of
the agency based on an arbitrary position.
64 In re Remius Adoption, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 346 P. 2d 672 (1959) ; In re Adoption of
Tschody, 267 Wis. 272, 65 N.W. 2d 17 (1954) ; In re Shields Adoption, 4 Wis. 2d 219,
89 N.W. 2d 827 (1958).
65 WIS. STAT. § 48.85 (1957); WASH. REV. CoDE § 26.32.010 (1961).
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The probate court has no jurisdiction to order an adoption, either
final or interlocutory, if the child is in the custody of the juvenile
court, or if there is pending in such court, custody or disposition, pro-
ceedings involving the child until such proceedings are terminated by
such court.66 There appears to be no such restriction upon the right
of the probate court to approve a placement of a child for adoption. 67
Prior to the hearing on the merits of the adoption, the placement
of the child must be considered by the court. The statute provides
that if the court finds (evidently from the allegations of the petition,
for at this point there has not yet been a hearing) that the child was
placed in the adoptive home in violation of the laws relating to the
placement of children in "foster" homes, the court may in its discre-
tion certify the matter to the juvenile court, or the court may after
notice to the natural parents, the petitioners, and the person who
placed the child, hold a hearing to determine whether the placement
was for the best interest of the child.6 8 The prescribed procedure has
been more fully discussed under the heading of "Adoptive Placement
of Children" supra.
If the illegal placement is made "legal" by the approval of either
the juvenile court or the probate court, the latter court may go
forward with the adoption proceedings.
At the hearing upon the adoption, the court must examine, under
oath, the child, if over 21 years of age and his consent to the adoption
is required, the petitioners, the next friend and all other persons in
interest who are present and to whom lawful notice has been given.6 9
This provision would appear to exclude the natural parents who have
permanently surrendered the child to a licensed agency as they would
not be proper parties to the proceedings or entitled to notice thereof.70
The court may, however, in its discretion, examine any other person
having knowledge or information pertinent to the adoption. Married
adoptive couples must be examined separate and apart from each
other, and the court must be satisfied that both are in favor of the
adoption.
The court must further be satisfied and find that the requirements
of the adoptive code have been complied with, that the petitioners
are suitably qualified to take care of and raise the child, and that
the best interests of the child will be served by the adoption before
granting the decree of adoption.71
There are two types of adoptive decrees, interlocutory and final.
The interlocutory decree is for a period of six months, and for this
66 OHzo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Page 1960).
67 Id. § 5103.16 (Page 1970).
68 Id. § 3107.08 (Page 1960).
. Id. § 3107.09 (Page 1960).
70 In re Boling, 83 Ohio App. 1, 82 N.E. 2d 135 (1948).
71 In re Adoption of Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E. 2d 51 (1962).
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period, subject. to the. final decree of the court, the child has the
status of an adopted child, except as to "property rights" which pre-
sumably would include rights of inheritance.
The interlocutory decree must be entered unless the court finds
that the child in question is the child, natural or adopted, of one of
the petitioners and is living in the home of the petitioner and his
spouse, or that the child was legally placed in the home of the adop-
tive parents and has resided there continuously six months prior to
the, date of hearing. It would appear that if the child was illegally
placed, the court could not waive the interlocutory period even
though the court found the placement beneficial to the child. If the
child is placed by an authorized agency, ft must visit the child at
reasonable intervals during the six months period and recommend
the. adoption. No such procedure is required if the child was other-
wise "legally placed"; .It is difficult to see how a child can be legally
placed, except through an authorized agency or by prior approval
of a court.
The granting of either a final or interlocutory decree of adoption
terminates the. jurisdiction of a divorce court over a child whose
parents are divorced.
The petitioners for adoption can, by the timing of the filing of
the petition, determine whether they will be eligible fot a final
decree at the time of the hearing. If they wait to file the petition
until. the, child has been in their home for five months, at the time
of the hearing (which must be held at more than thirty and not more
than sixty days dfterthe petition is filed) the child will have been
in the home for six months 'and they will be eligible for a final decree.
Most agencies favor this procedure as they feel that the -case work
they have done prior -to the time the child is placed and during the
six months period is sufficiently'exhaustive to protect both the -dhild
and adoptive parents, and the interlocutory period is unnecessary. How-
ever, in the usual case of agency placement, there is no court adjuca:
tion of the rights of the adoptive parents as to the child for the six
months period until the final decree is rendered. Upon the rendering
of the final decree, the obligations of the adoptive parents are perman-
ently fixed and cannot be annulled or revoked even though the child
may develop the most' hopeless mental or physical problems which
were unknown to anyone prior to the entry of the decree. It is the
opinion of the writer that the interlocutory period should not be
waived by. ,the adopting parents, except in extraordinary circum-
stances. As has been pointed out, this opinion is not shared by most
social agencies.
Recognized authorities in the field of adoption now feel that most
mental testing done with children under the age of one year is in-
conclusive. They also are of the opinion that it is important to place
a child for adoption as. soon as possible, after birth so that the. emo-
ept. 1972
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tional problems for the child in changing from one "mother image"
to another can be avoided.72
It would seem that at least from the adoptive parents' standpoint,
it would be better practice to place the child with them as soon after
birth as is physically possible, and that they should then be advised
that as soon as they feel that they can entirely accept the child and
have no reservations about the adoption, they should file the adoption
proceedings with the expectation that they will obtain an interlocu-
tory decree. During the interlocutory period, the child will have the
status of, their child except for property rights. If they wish to pro-
tect the child in this respect, they can do so by the execution of a
will which can be revoked if the adoption is not completed.
However, if, during the interlocutory period, the child develops
problems which will prevent the adoption from being to the best
interests of the child and the adoptive parents, the interlocutory
decree can be revoked and the petition dismissed at any time upon
motion of the petitioners.
Prior to the entry of the final decree, the court may upon its own
motion or upon the motion of any interested party, upon notice to
the petitioners, the next friend and any other person or organization
who has consented to the adoption, revoke the interlocutory decree,
if it finds that the adoption will not be for the best interest of the
child or for any other good cause.
If the interlocutory decree is not revoked within the six months
period, the court, without further hearing or proceedings, must enter
a final' decree of adoption, unless the court expressly finds that it
would be to the best interests of the child to extend the period of
the interlocutory order.7 3
If for any reason the adoption proceedings are dismissed, the
adoption is denied or the interlocutory decree is revoked, the child
must be returned to the custody of the authorized agency having its
permanent custody, if any. If the child has not been in such custody,
the court must certify the matter to the juvenile court of the county
where the child is then residing and that court must decide Who
should have its custody.74 Such certification does not constitute a
complaint against the natural parents that the child is dependent,
delinquent or neglected, but authorizes and requires the juvehile court
to make proper investigation to determine who has the responsibility
for its care. 75
Upon entry of the final decree of adoption, the probate court is
required to forward to the Departmente of Health a certificate of
72 E. Smith, READINGS IN ADOPTION (1963).
73 Ouio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.11 (Page 1960).'
74 Id. § 3107.12 (Page 1960).
75 Clark v. Allaman, 15+ Ohio St. 296, 95 N.E. 2d 753 (1950) in re Mc.Taggart, 2 Ohio
App. 2d 214, 207 N.E. 2d 562 (1965).
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adoption for the purpose of supplying the necessary information for
a new birth certificate.76
The Department of Health, "unless otherwise requested by the
adoptive parents," is required to issue a new birth certificate which
is to contain the same information and is to have the same overall
appearance as if the certificate had been issued for a child born to
the adoptive parents. 77 In what is rather startling statutory authority
to justify forgery, the Department of Health is authorized to supply
handwriting on the birth certificate where it may be required to
effect such appearance. The new certificate, which necessarily includes
essentially untrue information, upon being issued by the Department,
becomes the official record of the birth of the adopted child, and the
original certificate of birth ceases to be a public record. It is sealed
in an envelope Which is not to be opened except by order of the
probate court which decreed the adoption.
The new certificate is to be forwarded, to the local registrar of
vital statistics of the district where the birth actually occurred, and
is substituted for the original and true certificate. Any index refer-
ences to the latter must be then destroyed by the registrar and by
the probate court having possession of the same. The probate court
must, however, retain permanently in the file of the adoption pro-
ceedings such information as will enable the court to identify both
the original and new certificate of the birth of the child.
The statute is effective as to certificates of birth pertaining to
adoptions which have been completed prior to the effective date of
the statute, but birth certificates for children adopted in Ohio, but
born in other states, must be processed by the state of birth.
As has been pointed out, the provisions for the falsified certifi-
cate must be complied with "unless otherwise requested by the
adoptive parents." What kind of certificate will be issued if the
adoptive parents otherwise request is not stated. Presumably it
would be a certificate showing the birth and date of the child with
no reference to the natural parents or parent, and describing the
adoptive parents in their true relationship. It is the opinion of the
writer that the status of an adopted child is one in which both the
child and the adoptive parents can and should take pride, and the
attempt to hide the relationship by the use of false records and
writings can be considered as a poor reflection on a fine, healthy, and
usually unselfish relationship between the parties. Such legislation
is ill conceived and ill advised. 78
The adoption proceedings and papers pertaining to the proposed
placement of a child 79 must be recorded in a separate book kept by
76 OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 3107.11 (Page 1960).
77 Id. § 3705.18 (Page 1971).
Is New Birth Certificate Law Discussed, 38 ORno BARt 110 (1965).
79 1962 Omo Arr'y GEN. Op., at 2742.
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the probate court for this purpose. They must be separately in-
dexed,80 and are not to be journalized or generally recorded.8' The
papers and records are available for inspection only upon the per-
sonal direction of the probate judge.
Revocation of Adoption
Many of the states provide some machinery for the revocation of
an adoption under certain specified circumstances such as feeble
mindedness, epilepsy or insanity. Some of the states condition the
revocation upon the fact that these conditions existed prior to the
adoption, and that the adopting parents had no knowledge of the
same. Other states permit revocation upon the divorce of the adop-
tive parents or the abandonment of the adopted child. 2 In at least
one jurisdiction, a person who has been adopted as a minor can re-
voke the adoption within one year after coming of age by filing with
the probate court a dissent from the adoption. The court is thereupon
required to issue an order voiding the adoption.83
Ohio previously had a statute providing for the revocation
of an adoption for specified causes resulting from conditions existing
prior to the adoption which were unknown at the time to the adopt-
ing parents. 84 The present law makes no provision for annulment or
revocation of an adoption after the entry of a final decree, but, as
has been pointed out, does provide for the revocation of an inter-
locutory decree, if the court finds that the adoption will not be in
the best interest of the child or upon request of the adoptive parents.85
Under the contemplation of the Ohio statute that an adopted
child attains the status of a natural child, there appears to be no
reason to assume that a revocation of the adoption, at a time beyond
the interlocutory period, will be to the best interest of the adopting
parents or of the child. Natural parents of children assume the risks
of the unfortunate development of their children, and there appears
to be no valid reason to except adoptive parents from the same risks.
In a case decided by the Court of Appeals of Franklin County,
Ohio, the court held that where it was alleged that an agency placed
a child for adoption which was at birth afflicted with mongolism,
which fact was unknown to the adopting parents at the time the
adoptive decree was rendered, but was known to the agency, the
parents were entitled to have the court determine whether fraud
has been perpetrated to such extent that the adoptive parents would
be entitled to equitable relief from the order of adoption.8 6
go OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3107.14 (Page 1960); § 2101.12 (Page 1968).
81 1959 OHIO Avr'y GEN. Op., at 652.
82 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § ll1a (McKinney 1964), GA. CODE ANN. § 74-76 (1935).
83 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 454 (1959).
84 OHio GEN. CODE § 8030-2 (1910).
85 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.11 (Page 1960).
s6 In re Adoption of Sladky, 109 Ohio App. 120, 161 N.E. 2d 554 (1958).
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Legal Status of Adoption
The intended legal effect of adoption is to create between the
adoptive parents and the adoptive child the same status, with limited
exceptions, as exists between natural parents and their child. The
natural parent or parents are divested of all rights and obligations
due from them to the child and from the child to them, except in
the case of a natural parent married to an adopting parent.
8 7
Rights to the custody of adopted children are determined in the
event of separation or divorce of the adoptive parents in exactly the
same manner as with children who were born naturally to the
parties.88 In the case of the death of both the adoptive parents, it
has been held that there is no person entitled to the custody of the
adopted child as a matter of right by reason of the adoption decree
of another state, that neither a sister by adoption nor the natural
mother, who had relinquished her right, succeeded to the rights of
the adoptive parents, but the matter of its custody should be deter-
mined by the court upon consideration of the best interests of the
child.8 9
The. status of an adopted child in Ohio is a permanent, continu-
ing concept of law which is not limited in time to the minority of
the adopted child or, when rights of inheritance are considered, to
the lives of the parties.90 .
Ohio recognizes the status of a person adopted in a state which
at the time' was the domicile of the adoptive parents, even though
such adopted person had attained his majority at the time of the
adoption and could, therefore, not be adopted in Ohio. 91 The status
of adoption which was incurred in a foreign state will be given
effect in Ohio, upon evidence being offered that there was compliance
with the laws of the state where the decree was rendered.92
Rights of Inheritance
The rights of inheritance of an adopted child are broadly defined
in the statute as being the same as if the child had been born to the
adopting parents in lawful wedlock and not born to the natural
parents, except that such child shall not be capable of inheriting or
succeeding to property expressly limited to the heirs of the body
of the adoptive parents, and further excepting that the status of a
natural parent married to the adopting parent shall not in any way
8T OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page 1960).
88 Martin v. Fisher, 25 Ohio App. 372, 158 N.E. 287 (1927).
89 In re Griffin, 30 Ohio Op. 367, 150 Sup. & C.P. Dec. 101 (C.P. 1945)....
90 Barrett v. Delmore, 143 Ohio St. 203, 54 N.E. 2d.789 (1944).
91 Id.
92 Belden v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio App. 358 (1951); Blaustein v. Blaustein, 77 Ohio.App.
281, 66 N.E. 2d 156 (4946).
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be effected. An adopted child can take under a will of a natural
parent which identifies such child clearly by the name given him
by his natural parents, by his adoptive name or by any other means.93
As has been previously. stated, adoption statutes are held in
derogation of the common law and must, therefore, be strictly con-
strued.94 However, it has also been held that the statutes of inheri-
tance, including those pertaining to adoption, are excluded by Section
1.11 of the Ohio Revised Code from such rule of strict construction.95
The statutes in effect at the time of the death of the decedent,
and not those in effect at the time of the adoption, govern the adopted
child's rights of inheritance. 96 These statutes,. and the changes made
in 'them from time to time, are matters of legislative policy. They do
not deal with vested rights, and are not violative of the constitutions
of either the Unied States or of the State of Ohio.9 7
An adopted child is entitled to the rights, of a pretermitted heir
as to a will made prior to the adoption.9 8
A.. -Inheritance From Natural Parents
An adopted child cannot take under the laws of intestate suc-
cession from the child's natural parents. The statutory provision to
this effect99 does not violate the state or federal constitution. 0 0 As
has been pointed out, the statute does not prohibit the child from
taking under' a will of a natural parent when the 'child is clearly iden-
tified. Where a child is adopted b&y a grandparent, he loses his rights as
an heir of a natural parent who is the child of the decedent grand-
parent, as it is not contemplated that an adopted child should receive
a larger share than a natural child.' 0 i
A child who is readopted by his natural parent or parents is
restored to his status as a natural child of, such parent or parents to
the same extent as if there had been no adoption.102
. In a recent case it was held that the words "lineal descendants
of my blood" clearly identifies grandchildren of a testator who have
been adopted by nonrelatives. 103
93 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page 1960).
94 In re Todhunter, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 567, 35 N.E. 2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1943).
95 Frame v. Schaffer, 3.9 Ohio L. Abs..617, 27 Ohio Op. 346 (C.P. 1943).
96 Staley v. Honeyman, 157 Ohio St. 61, 104. N.E..2d. 172 (1952); Flynn v. Bradbeck,
147 Ohio St. 4.9, 68 N.E. 2d 75 (1952).
97 In re Estate of"Millward, 166 Ohio St. 243, 141 N.E. 2d 4-62' (1957),
98 Surman v. Surman, ii"4 Ohio -St. 579, 151 N.E. 708 (1926).
9 OHIo Rev. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page 1960).
1o0 In re Estate of Millward, 166 Ohio St. 243, 141 N.E. 2d: 462 (1957).
101 Smith v. Carver, 55 Ohio St. 642, 48 N.E..1118(1896) ; Paul V. Paul, 31 Ohio L. Abs;
453, 17 Ohio Op. 392 (P. Ct. 1940). . -. : . , . -
102 OyAo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3107.07 (Page 1960).
a03 Saintignon v. Saintignon, 5 Ohio App. 2d 133, (1966).
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B. Collateral Inheritance
The right of inheritance of an adopted child being the same as
a natural child, it can inherit from or through collateral kin such as
the cousin or a sister of a deceased adoptive parent.'
0 4
Upon the death of an adopted child intestate leaving no spouse,
issue or adoptive parents surviving, the estate of such deceased child
passes to the next of kin of the adoptive parents, and not to the na-
tural next of kin of the child.105 The former statute in point provided
that the natural next of kin would inherit under such circum-
stances, 0 6 and required that adoptive parents carefully provide for
such a contingency in their wills to prevent their estate from even-
tually passing to natural next of kin of the adopted child to their
unjust enrichment under the usual circumstances.
Will Construction
The question of the interpretation of the words "issue," "heir,"
"descendant," and "child" when applied to wills, contracts or in-
strunents of conveyance involving adopted children is troublesome
in Ohio. Other than the general statutory fiat that an adopted child
is to be considered in all respects, save in connection with a fee tail
estate, as the natural child of the adoptive parents,10 7 there is no clear
statutory authority to aid in construing these words to include adopted
children.
While it is recognized that generally the words in question should
be given the meaning which is intended by the user, in light of the
obvious statutory intention to make an adopted child in all respects,
save one, of equal status with a natural child, it would seem not
unreasonable for the legislature to implement the adoption statute
by specifically providing that the words in question, whenever and
wherever used, shall be construed to include adopted children, ex-
cepting, of course, where the intention is to create a fee tail estate.
The case law in Ohio generally supports this position.
An adopted child is included within the meaning of the word
"issue" as used in Ohio Rev. Code § 2105.10, which defines the descent
of property of which the relict of a deceased husband or wife dies
possessed, intestate and without issue.1 08
There is a holding that the word "issue" may mean adopted
children or heirs at law, and that where a donor used the words
"child or children", referring to his children, the presumption would
be that he intended to include adopted children whether or not
adopted at the time of the execution of the instrument, but where a
stranger uses the same term in connection with children not his own,
104 Staley v. Honeyman, 157 Ohio St. 61, 104 N.E. 2d 172 (1952).
105 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.13 (Page 1960).
100 Omo GEN. CODE § 10512.19 (Page 1910).
107 OHIO REV. CODE ANx. § 3107.13 (Page 1960).
108 Id. § 2105.10 (Page 1968).
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the presumption would be that he does not intend to include adopted
children.10 9 A devise of a remainder "to the heirs at law" of a benefi-
ciary includes an adopted child.110
The general rule in states other than Ohio appears to be in favor
of the inclusion of adopted children within the classes designated
as issue, descendants, children and heirs. 11
Defective Adoption and Contracts
As adoption is purely statutory in Ohio, there can be no rights
which accrue by reason of a [de]facto adoption when there has not
been substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute.112
There is, however, a presumption that all the provisions of law were
fully complied within a decree of adoption which persists until over-
come by proof to the contrary.1 13 A defect which defeats the proceed-
ings must be jurisdictional.
While the law in Ohio is not entirely clear on the point, there is
some authority that a contract to adopt entered into between the
parents of a child and persons who agree to the adoption and to make
the child an heir, will be specifically enforced when it does not vio-
late the statutes of frauds, and where it has been fully performed by
the child.114
Collateral Attack
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a decree or order of
adoption made by a court which had no jurisdiction can be attacked
by a habeus corpus proceeding brought by the natural mother.15
Where the court had jurisdiction, no collateral attack will be per-
mitted, and there exists a presumption that all the required proce-
dural steps have been complied with.116
The Probate Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, has held that
children who wished to inherit from their natural father could set
aside a decree which made them the adopted children of third per-
sons, where the natural father had not been properly served with
notice of the adoption proceedings. The opinion does not indicate
that the adoptive parents were made a party to the proceedings to set
aside the decree or otherwise identify the defendant who is indicated
in the opinion to have acted as his own attorney. 117
109 Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N.E. 654 (1932).
110 Smith v. Hunter, 86 Ohio St. 106, 99 N.E. 91 (1912).
Mfl Annot., 133 A.L.R. 597 (194-1) ; 166 A.L.R. 150 (1946).
112 Glass v. Glass, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 125 N.E. 2d 375 (Ct. App. 1952) ; Kendall v.
Kendall, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 428, (C.P. 1882).
113 In re Martin, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 219, 140 N.E. 2d 623 (Ct. App. 1957).
114 Snyder v. Shuttleworth, 5 Ohio App. 137, 25 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 545 (1916).
115 In re Ramsey, 164 Ohio St. 567, 132 N.E. 469 (1956).
116 Marlin v. Fisher, 25 Ohio App. 372, 158 N.E. (1927); In re Adoption of McLean,
65 Ohio App. 106, 29 N.E. 2d 425 (1940); Lawson v. Thomas, 48 Ohio App. 311,
193 N.E. 655 (1934).
117 Balint v. Horvath, 5 Ohio Misc. 242 (P. Ct. 1965).
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Conclusion
The adoption statutes in Ohio operate effectively in situations
where there has been a voluntary permanent surrender of the custody
of the child to an authorized agency by a natural parent, followed
by a prompt placement of the child by the agency in an adoptive
home and consent by the agency to the subsequent adoption. Prob-
lems do arise, however, when the natural parents wish to rescind a
surrender or consent which they have already given to an agency.
Where there has been no voluntary surrender to an agency, the
statutes of Ohio are cumbersome, confusing and ineffective in pro-
viding machinery for the placement of the child and the termination
of the rights and obligations of the natural parents.
These rights should in every case, except in stepparent adoptions,
be terminated prior to the adoptive placement, and the child there-
upon placed in the permanent custody of an agency, either public or
private. The proceedings should include both voluntary and involun-
tary terminations of parental rights and obligations. Persons who
desire to voluntarily surrender their ehild to an authorized agency,
whether they be minors or adults, should appear before the court
or an officer of the court for this purpose, and such surrender should
not thereafter be subject to revocation by them in the absence of
fraud.
This procedure would eliminate any confrontation or issues be-
tween the natural parents and the adoptive parents, and would fur-
ther eliminate the risk that the child would have to be removed
from the adoptive home after placement because of failure to obtain
the consent of the natural parents, or the inability to obtain a deter-
mination that such consent is not necessary. The child should be
placed under the umbrella of responsibility of an authorized agency
which could not only make sure that it was being properly cared
for, but also that its right to be adopted properly was being fulfilled
promptly and without prejudice to it.
The termination proceedings could well be handled exclusively
by the juvenile court, thereby eliminating any consideration of the
natural parents from the proceedings of adoption, which could remain
to be the province of the probate court.
The adoption proceedings should provide for a court review of
the position of an agency which refuses to consent to an adoption.
The identification of the child should be by reference to its birth
certificate or by the report of the next friend, and not by an allega-
tion in the petition.
The interlocutory decree should be required in every case, ex-
cept in stepparent adoptions, and should not be subject to waiver by
the court. The adoptive parents would thereby be required to take
the full protection provided by law, and they would not be subject
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both to emotional pressures and, pressures originating from the agency
to complete the adoption as soon as possible after placement of the
child.
The adoptive birth certificates should be in a form that properly
reflects the adoptive status without, of course, identifying the natural
parents.
Finally, there should be statutory recognition of the fact that
some doubt exists that the words "heirs," "issue," "descendants" etc.
may be construed to exclude adopted children, and provision should
be made that such words, whenever and however used, include
adopted children within their meaning.
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